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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

should be cured by a Section 266 order except where fraud is perpetrated
by the purchaser or his assignee. In other words, ignorantia legis neminem
excusat-ignorance of the law is no defense.
If the foregoing viewpoint was adopted by the Supreme Court, it would
be in compliance with the basic legislative intent manifested in Section 266
that tax deeds shall be "incontestable."
L. S. DOTSON

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-WHETHER

STATE

ACTION

REQUIRING

PUBLIC

SCHOOLS TO BEGIN EACH DAY WITH READINGS FROM THE BIBLE VIOLATES

THE FIRST AMENDMENT-The

two companion

cases herein considered,

School District of Abington Township v. Schempp and Murray v. Curlett,1
presented issues to the United States Supreme Court in the context of state
enactments compelling public schools to begin each day with readings from
the Bible.
In the Schempp case, a Pennsylvania statute required that:
At least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without
comment, at the opening of each public school on each school day.
Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading, or attending
reading, upon the written request of his parent or
such Bible
2
guardian.
The children, who were Unitarians, attended a high school at which
exercises were conducted pursuant to the statute. Selected students, supervised by teachers, read the passages. The statute as amended imposed no
penalty upon a teacher refusing to obey its mandate. However, the possibility definitely existed that such a teacher would have his contract of
employment terminated for violating the school laws. During the exercises,
various different versions of the Bible were used. This was apparently
done so as to show no favoritism toward any one particular religion. No
comments or explanations were given and students and parents were notified that participation was not mandatory 3
The parents of the children brought an action in equity to enjoin the
practice created by the statute. At the trial, Edward Schempp, father of the
students, testified that he decided against withdrawing his children from
attending the exercises because he felt that the children's relationships with
1 374 U.S. 203, 83 Sup. Ct. 1560, 10 L. Ed. 2d 844 (1963).
2 Id. at 1562 (24 Pa. Stat. sec. 15-1516, as amended, Pub. Law 1928 (Supp. 1960)
Dec. 17, 1959).
8 The action was brought in 1958 before the amendment authorizing a child's nonattendance at the exercises upon parental request. The District Court held the statute
unconstitutional under both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. 177
F. Supp. 398. The statute was then amended and the judgment vacated and remanded
for further proceedings. 364 U.S. 298, 81 Sup. Ct. 268, 5 L. Ed. 2d 89.
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their teachers and classmates would suffer. The trial court, in deciding the
issues of fact presented by the arguments of the litigants, held that the
childrens' attendance was compulsory, the exercises were compelled by law,
and the readings were of a religious character and constituted a religious
observance. In finding the statute violative of the "establishment clause"
of the First Amendment as applied to the states by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the trial court stated that the intention of
the Commonwealth was to bring a religious ceremony into the public
schools. The defendant school district, after being enjoined from enforcing
the statute, appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court.
The Board of School Commissioners, in the Murray case, enacted a rule
which provided "for the holding of opening exercises in the schools of the
city consisting primarily of the reading, without comment, of a chapter in
the Holy Bible and/or the use of the Lord's Prayer." 4 The petitioners
were professed atheists. At their insistence, the rule had been amended to
allow children to be excused from the exercise on request of the parent.
Advantage had been taken of the amendment to the rule but the
petitioners still felt that the rule as amended violated their constitutional
right to freedom of religion. They brought a mandamus action in the
Superior Court of Baltimore City, Maryland, to compel the rescission of
the entire rule. The Superior Court rendered judgment for defendants and
plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed and certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court of the United States.
In the majority opinion, the Supreme Court held that the practices
at issue were unconstitutional under the "establishment clause" of the First
Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 5
It is interesting to note that in both cases, the parties argued violations
pertaining to the "free exercise" of religion clause and not to the "establishment clause" of the First Amendment. Mr. Justice Stewart noted this
fact in his opinion.
The majority opinion stressed the fact that religion is closely identified
with our history and government. Our national existence reflects a highly
religious people as shown by the continuance in oaths of office of the words
"So help me God"; by the fact that each House of Congress has a chaplain
who recites a prayer at the beginning of each session; and, in addition, the
sessions of the United States Supreme Court are declared open by the crier
in a ceremony, the final phrase of which invokes the grace of God.
This identification of religion with our history and government does
not mean that religious freedom is not also as strongly imbedded in our
public and private life. Each page of history tells of an experience of reli4 School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, supra note 1, at 1565. (Adopted
pursuant to Art. 77, sec. 202 of the Annotated Code of Maryland).
5 Mr. Justice Stewart dissented with opinion.
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gious persecution suffered by our ancestors whenever any single religion
became associated with the government in power at the time. The Court
reasoned that the federal government was placed in a neutral position by
the First Amendment so as to avoid further religious persecution. As the
Abington and Murray cases involved state action, before delving into the
"neutral position theory," the Court briefly reiterated two basic doctrines:
(1) the First Amendment had been made applicable to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) the First Amendment forbids governmental legislation if its purpose is either the advancement or inhibition of
religion. These two conclusions have been long recognized; these litigants
did not question them.6
It was contended by the attorneys for the school district that failure
to permit the exercises would give rise to a religion of secularism. While
it is true that a State may not establish a religion of secularism in the sense
of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility toward religion and thus preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe, the
majority reasoned that failure to permit the exercises did not have that
effect because study of the Bible as to its literary and historical qualities
was not barred. As the majority opinion states, "Nothing we have said here
indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected consistent with the First Amendment." 7 If the readings had been accompanied
with literary and historic discussion and comments, they might have come
within this exception.
The school district also contended that if the Court failed to permit
the exercises, the majority's right to the free exercise of religion would
be violated. The Court pointed out that the "free exercise" clause did not
permit a majority to use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs;
the very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from political controversy and place them beyond the reach of majorities.
Our political process by which our government officials are elected is not
applicable to the subject of religion. The individual decides which religion,
if any, he will follow. Allowing the majority to make this decision could
only lead to suppression of minority religions.
The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establiment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....
The two clauses contained in that amendment forbid two different kinds of
governmental usurpation which in certain instances may overlap. The first
clause does not permit the government to force religion or any form of
worship on any-body. The second clause grants the right to the individual
6 Application to the States of other clauses of the First Amendment occurred as
early as 1925. Gitlow v. People of the State of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct.
625, 69 L. Ed. 1138 (1925).
7 School District of Abington Township, v. Schempp, supra note 1, at 1573.
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to choose his own form of veneration. Situations arise whereby the enforcement of one of the clauses creates a violation of the other clause. An example of this is the military service. The Government supplies buildings
and materials for religious functions. The men in the armed services cannot provide their own religious facilities. Failure to allow the Government
to supply the necessary materials would deprive the servicemen of their
right to follow their own religion. Such refusal might be considered as an
act hostile to religion. This delicate interrelationship was first discussed by
the court in Cantwell v. Connecticut.8 In that case the defendants, members
of Jehovah's Witnesses, were convicted of violating a state statute. The
statute provided that solicitation for any religious organization would not
be permitted unless approval had been given by the secretary of the state
public welfare council. The secretary would issue a license or certificate
if he found the cause to be a religious one. The Court held that allowing
the state to determine what is a religious cause places an undue burden
upon the exercise protected by the Constitution. It was further stated by
the court that:
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion
by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of
worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose
cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free
exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the amendment embraces two concepts,-the first is absolute but, in the nature of
things, the second cannot.9
Mr. Justice Black, a few years later, stated that the First Amendment
"requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious
believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions
than it is to favor them."' 10 Later cases, such as McCollum v. Board of
Education and Zorach v. Clauson, considering the destructive religious
conflicts in history, affirmed this doctrine of separation of Church and
State."
In the McCollum case, religious teachers, employed by private religious
groups, were allowed to come into school buildings during the regular
hours set aside for secular teaching and substitute their religious teachings.
The facts showed that tax-supported property was being used for religious
instruction and that school authorities were cooperating with the religious
council. The Court held that the First Amendment clearly banned such
8 310 U.S. 296, 60 Sup. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940).

9 Id. at 303.
10 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, at 18.
11 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 Sup. Ct. 461, 92 L. Ed. 649
(1948); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 71 Sup. Ct. 679, 96 L. Ed. 954 (1952).
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action. On the other hand, the Zorach case concerned a "released time"
program whereby public school students were permitted to leave the public
school during the school day and go to religious centers for religious instruction or else stay in the public school classroom. This program did not
involve the use of public schools nor the expenditure of public funds and
therefore did not violate the establishment clause.
It would appear, therefore, that a recognition of the teachings of history
coupled with the basic beliefs of the people as to freedom of religion caused
the framers of the Constitution to incorporate within the document the
First Amendment so as to avoid those situations of religious persecution
which had occurred throughout the history of mankind. The Court in interpreting the phraseology of the First Amendment has placed the government
in a neutral position in order to facilitate the enforcement of the First
Amendment. This proposition appears theoretically trouble-free on its face,
but difficulties arise when the Supreme Court has to deal with specific
factual situations. The "establishment clause" prohibits the creation of any
advances or inhibitions towards religion by the government and the "free
exercise" clause allows every individual to freely choose his own course.
When placing a legislative enactment beside the "establishment clause"
to decide the statute's constitutionality, the Court must look to the purpose
and practical effect of the enactment: if the purpose is either the advancement of inhibition of religion, then the government has strayed from its
neutral position and the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power
as circumscribed by the Constitution. In a case involving the "free exercise"
clause, a coersive effect as to the practice of religion is the violation of
constitutional rights. However, the "establishment clause" may be violated
without the presence of any coercion. The creation of the advance or
inhibition violates the Constitution.
The previously stated principles were so well recognized that the
Supreme Court without the citation of a single case reaffirmed them in
Engel v. Vitale.12 At issue in that case was a twenty-two word prayer recited
each morning in the public schools. The Court in a six to one decision
declared the practice unconstitutional.' 3 This was the first instance where
a state actually composed a prayer and then inserted the prayer into one
of its compulsory institutions. The majority opinion stated that in the
light of history the prohibition against governmental establishment of
religion meant that the government was without authority to prescribe
an official prayer as such prescription violated the establishment clause of
the First Amendment. In discussing the two clauses of the First Amendment, the majority opinion stated:
Although these two clauses may in certain instances overlap, they
370 U.S. 421, 82 Sup. Ct. 1261, 8 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1962).
Mr. Justice Stewart dissented. Justices Frankfurter and White did not participate
in the decision.
12
18
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forbid two quite different kinds of governmental encroachment
upon religious freedom. The Establishment Clause, unlike the
Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct
governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws
which establish an official religion whether those laws operate
directly to coerce non-observing individuals or not. This is not to
say, of course, that laws officially prescribing a particular form of
religious worship do not involve coercion of such individuals.
When the power, prestige and financial support of government is
placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive
to conform to the prevailing
pressure upon religious minorities 14
officially approved religion is plain.
The state laws in the Abington and Murray cases fall directly within
the scope of the decision of Engel. The opening exercises were in the
nature of religious ceremonies. Any possible argument as to the nature
of the readings can be completely abrogated simply by pointing to the fact
that the readings, without comment, were taken from the Bible, which is
undeniably an instrument of religion. Furthermore, the activities were considered part of the curriculum of the students who were required by law
to attend school. The prayers were read in the school building under the
supervision and participation of instructors employed in those schools.' 5
The Court concluded that the facts showed that the state statutes were
establishing a religious service.
Mr. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, in addition to his
remarks pertaining to the discussion of the majority opinion, noted that
through the mechanism of the State, all of the people were being required
to finance a religious exercise and the most effective way to establish any
institution is, of course, to finance it.
Mr. Justice Brennan, in a very long concurring opinion, reviewed the
historical background pertinent to the problems arising under the First
Amendment. He upheld the distinction between the McCollum and
Zorach cases, stating that the McCollum program placed the religious
instructor in the same position as that held by the teacher of secular subjects while the Zorach program did not. 16
Mr. Justice Goldberg, in a concurring opinion joined by Mr. Justice
Harlan, considered the exercises to be of such a nature as to exclude
the readings from being characterized as accommodation by the state in the
interests of religious liberty.
The dissent, written by Mr. Justice Stewart, emphasized the state's
14 Engel v. Vitale, supra note 12, at 430-431, 82 Sup. Ct. at 1267, 8 L. Ed. 2d at 603.
15 The fact that the State was financing the exercises brings the case within the

scope of the McCollum decision.
16 Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion distinguishes the "Sunday Law" Cases from the
cases at hand on the basic ground that the "Sunday Laws," although first enacted for
religious ends, continued in force for reasons wholly secular, The laws here being considered were enacted for religious purposes.
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position and appears to concern itself with the rights of the majority only.
He stated that the statutes in question authorizing religious exercises in
public schools should be considered as measures making possible the free
exercise of religion; for the government to be truly neutral, it should permit
exercises for those who want them and failure to allow the exercises places
religion at an artificial and state-created disadvantage. He concluded by
stating that the evidence did not show that children were under any form
of coercion to participate and therefore the cases should have been remanded to the lower courts to make findings on the question of coercion.

In answer to Mr. Justice Stewart, the majority opinion clearly indicated
that the machinery of the State should not be used for religious purposes.
The fact that a majority of the population desires such exercises does not
give them the right to impose their will upon the minority. Allowing them
to do so could create religious disturbances. That was the effect of such
action in other times in history. Another factor to be remembered is that
religious freedom can be and should be practiced in institutions not affiliated with the government. As previously stated, the element of coercion
is not necessary in order to show a violation of the establishment clause.
It is obvious that this decision did not settle completely the question as
to the application of the First Amendment as interpreted by the Court.
While it may now appear obvious that recitation of prayers in a public
school violates the First Amendment, the interpretation and general principles set down by the Court in this decision may not lend themselves to
other and varied situations. For instance, one future problem pertains to
the military service. The federal government provides buildings for religious services for men in the armed services. Would this type of government
regulation be considered a violation of the First Amendment? I8 Another
problem concerns the distinction between the study of religion and religious ceremonies. While religious ceremonies will not be permitted in
public schools, the Court did state that the study of religion would not
constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause. At first blush it would
appear that the two are obviously different in nature. Yet when one considers that the study of religion is usually connected with the complete
indoctrination of an individual into a religion and that while such studies
may not be religious services as such but may be part of a program to
establish a religion, the problem does begin to come to the surface.
It is now apparent that the State may not attempt to create a religious
17 Mr. Justice Stewart restated in greater detail the position he took in Engel v.
Vitale where he was also the lone dissenter.
Is The Court, in a note in the Schempp case stated, "We are not of course presented
with and therefore do not pass upon a situation such as military service, where the
Government regulates the temporal and geographic environment of individuals to a
point that, unless it permits voluntary religious services to be conducted with the use
of government facilities, military personnel would be unable to engage in the practice
of their faiths." 83 Sup. Ct. 1560, 1573.
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aura, or advance or inhibit any religion. The realm of religion is set oft
from the political structure. The secular must remain apart from the religious. So long as the governments, both Federal and State, remain neutral,
we can maintain and fully exercise the right to choose and follow our own
religion.
G. COHEN

PATENT AcQuISITION-VIOLATION

OF SHERMAN

ANTITRUST

LAW-ONE

of the most difficult areas of corporate law practice involves advising the
client so as to prevent violations of the Antitrust laws. This problem
becomes more complicated when the client notifies his attorney that he
wants to acquire patents from his competitors. In this patent-antitrust area
we immediately encounter what seems to be a conflict of concepts since the
patent law specifically authorizes the acquisition of patents, which necessarily involves the acquisition of a legal monopoly. 1 Yet the antitrust law
prohibits "...
every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monop2
olize."
Thus, in the recent decision of United States v. Singer Mfg. Co.,8 the
Supreme Court found that Singer had exceeded the limitations of the
Sherman Act. In this case the lower court had dismissed the Government's
civil antitrust suit against Singer, finding non-meritorious the Government's claim of an alleged violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act by a conspiracy and combination to exclude the Japanese
from their importation and sale of infringing zig-zag sewing machines.
FACTS OF THE CASE

After an Italian sewing machine manufacturer, Necchi, had demonstrated a definite U.S. market for a household zig-zag sewing machine,
Singer, as well as many foreign manufacturers, put its staff to work to
develop a simplified sewing machine mechanism capable of automatically
producing zig-zag and various ornamental patterns. By 1954, Singer had
developed several such machines, was producing them and had filed two
1 The U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 8 authorizes Congress to "To promote the Progress

of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries." Under the patent Code, 35 U.S.C. 101, whoever
"invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent . . . "
Section 154 provides that a patent shall contain a grant "of the right to exclude others
from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States" for the term
of seventeen years.
2 The Sherman Act, Sec. 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. 1 et seq. (1959) prohibits:
"Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restaint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or foreign nations .... ." Section 2 further prohibits "Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.
8 371 U.S. 918, 10 L. Ed. 2d 823 (1963).

